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Abstract
How much do market participants in different industries value a marginal change in
patent term (i.e., duration of patent protection)? We explore this research question
by measuring the behavioral response of patentees to a rare natural experiment:
a change in patent term rules, due to passage of the TRIPS agreement. We find
significant heterogeneity in patentee behavior across industries, some of which follows
conventional wisdom (patent term is important in pharmaceuticals) and some of
which does not (it also appears to matter for some software). Our measure is highly
correlated with patent renewal rates across industries, suggesting the marginal value
of patent term increases with higher expected profits toward the end of term.
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1 Introduction
Since Nordhaus 1967 and Scherer 1972, scholars have debated what constitutes an
optimal patent term — that is, the duration that maximizes the creation of socially
valuable innovation net of social costs such as deadweight loss. The debate continues
today, with some claiming the U.S. patent system is bloated and duration should be
curtailed or even eliminated altogether, particularly for industries such as software,
where patents are thought to be less important (Boldrin and Levine 2008). Others
believe the current system works well enough, with patents encouraging the creation
of new and useful inventions. Still others suggest problems might be industry-specific,
e.g., Budish et al. 2013, and some claim we should move away from our current regime
of uniform patent duration to one in which term is customized across technologies
(Roin 2014).
A first step in evaluating these arguments and assessing what constitutes an optimal
patent term is to measure the private value of patents to their owners. More specif-
ically: how do patentees across industries differ in how they value patent duration?
Why does this variation exist? And how might they respond to a marginal change in
patent term rules? The last question is of particular policy importance, as reforms
to the patent system are perhaps most likely to occur on the margins.
Previous attempts to answer these research questions have faced some limitations.
Some prior studies, most notably Levin et al. 1987 and Cohen et al. 2000, use survey
data to measure the relative importance of patents across industries. Levin et al. 1987
survey 650 high-level R&D executives and find patents are particularly important in
chemical and drug industries, but less so elsewhere. Cohen et al. 2000 survey 1,478
R&D laboratories and find companies use a mix of patents, secrecy, and lead time
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to protect their intellectual assets, with patents typically used to block rivals from
producing substitutes in chemical industries, and as negotiating levers in the telecom-
munications and semiconductor industries. Arora et al. 2008 use the same data to
calculate patent premiums across different industry categories. While undoubtedly
important, the relatively small sample size of these studies and inherent limitations
of survey methodologies restrict the extent to which we can make fine-grained dis-
tinctions about the variable importance of patent protection. Moreover, these studies
only capture self-reported estimates of the total value of patent protection; they do
not measure a behavioral response to a change in patent term rules.
Other classic papers, such as Pakes and Schankerman 1984, Schankerman and Pakes
1985, and Pakes 1986, measure patent value via structural models that use data on
patent maintenance fees, which are fees a patentee must pay to avoid expiration of
her patent. Typically these papers use European patent data, as the European patent
system requires more frequent renewal decisions than the American one. For example,
Schankerman 1998, applying nonparametric techniques created by Pakes et al. 1989,
uses patent renewal rates to measure the private value of French patents and their
relative importance across industry categories.
Such renewal rates, however, are a relatively coarse measure of patent value, as they
only tell us if a patentee valued her invention more than the cost of the maintenance
fees, which are only in the hundreds or few thousands of dollars. Absent further
assumptions, renewal rates do not necessarily inform us of the full distribution of
patent values, nor do they let us easily distinguish among the majority of patents
whose value exceeds the fee threshold.
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Somewhat relatedly, other papers explore whether patent counts — the number of
patents awarded to firms or across industries in a unit of time — are good measures
of economic activity and technological advancement (e.g., Abrams 2009; Griliches
et al. [1986]; Lanjouw et al. [1998b]; Van Pottelsberghe et al. [2001]). These papers,
however, do not measure the private value of patents to their owners.
Finally and most recently, Kogan et al. 2017 create a structural model and use a stock
market event study methodology around the date of patent grant to measure the
private value of patents. This approach, however, is limited to measuring aggregate
patent value only as of the date of patent issuance; it does not separate out the
marginal value of the last years of patent term. Moreover, their analysis is limited to
patents owned by publicly-traded firms, which constitute a small fraction of all issued
patents.
Most importantly, none of these prior studies directly measures the marginal response
of patentees to changes in patent term rules. But the marginal value of duration is
likely of special relevance to policymakers, as this is a policy lever they have previously
used when reforming the patent system.1
We fill this gap in the existing literature by exploiting a rare natural experiment in
which patent duration rules changed, when the United States adopted The Agreement
1As an example, consider the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Act), which allowed certain pioneer drugs to receive patent term extensions equal
to one-half of the time they spend in the investigational new drug period before the Food and
Drug Administration, subject to certain caps. The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999
(35 U.S.C. § 154(b)) enabled patentees to recover some patent term for applications that take too
long to process by the PTO. And Congress occasionally passes bills that extend terms on specific
patents, in response to lobbying from the patent owners.
5
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1995. Prior to
this law, a patentee received a fixed patent term that began only when a patent
issued. Hence, if a patentee wanted to prevent her patent term clock from starting —
perhaps because she planned to commercialize her invention much later in the future
— she could slow down the patent application process so that her patent would issue
later. TRIPS, however, changed this dynamic by specifying that the patent term clock
would start on the date a patent application was filed. So after TRIPS, a patent’s
effective term (i.e., the period where it could be used to file suit) was reduced by
however long the inventor took to get her patent application approved.
Our approach is based on the simple idea that an applicant who cares about patent
term would seize the opportunity presented by TRIPS — namely, by speeding up
the patenting process (or equivalently, by no longer delaying this process), she could
lengthen her effective patent term. Our hypothesis is that applicants in industries in
which patent term is especially important would be more likely to speed up prosecu-
tion than applicants in industries in which term is less important.
To conduct our analysis, we construct a new dataset based on the transaction histories
of 407,707 issued patents filed between 1994 and 1996. Because the patenting process
(also known as patent prosecution) is a back-and-forth process between applicants
and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), we parse the data to determine
what portion of prosecution time is attributable to the patent applicant. We find
the average applicant sped up prosecution by about 4.16% due to TRIPS, thereby
validating a prediction by Lemley 1994.
More importantly, our approach allows us to develop a comprehensive measure of the
marginal value of patent duration, based on the behavioral response of patentees to
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a change in patent term rules. We find this response varies greatly across industries.
In line with conventional wisdom, we find pharmaceutical and chemical applicants
are especially sensitive to patent term (Grabowski 2002), particularly in the field of
genetics. More surprisingly, some software and computer applicants also sped up
the patenting process, suggesting patent duration might be more important for them
than is commonly believed (Wagner 2006). Other applicants, such as mechanical
patentees, responded less to the change of law, indicating a lengthy patent term is of
less importance to them.
To address potential selection issues created by applicants who anticipated the legal
change, we test alternate specifications, including some where we exclude applications
filed around the date the law went into effect and others where we test different
measures of applicant delay. We obtain similar results and consistently identify the
same industries as more sensitive to patent term change.2
Finally, we compare our new cross-industry measure of the marginal value of patent
duration with two previous patent value measures. We find that our measure cor-
relates both with the rate at which patentees pay maintenance fees, which as noted
above, is a noisy measure of the late-term patent profits, as well as the survey-based
measure created by Cohen et al. 2000 and used in Arora et al. 2008. While ours is
the first comprehensive measure of the marginal value of a change in patent duration,
this cross-validation exercise supports the notion that our approach credibly measures
patent term sensitivity.
2Although we control for selection, in some ways selection is actually what we want to measure, since
it implicitly tells us how much applicants care about the change in term rules. In other words, the
industries in which the most selection occurs are the ones that care the most about patent term.
We explore this possibility in more detail in section 2.6 below.
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2 Measuring the Behavioral Response to a Change
in Patent Term Rules
2.1 Empirical Strategy and Data
Laws governing patent term rarely change. Since Congress established the patent
system in 1790, the baseline term for a patent has changed only three times: in 1836
(increased from 14 to 21 years from patent issuance), 1861 (decreased to 17 years from
patent issuance), and 1995 (changed to 20 years from patent application date). The
rarity of such changes likely explains why applicant sensitivity to changes in patent
term rules has been relatively unexplored by scholars.
Here, we exploit the 1995 rule change, when the United States adopted TRIPS. Prior
to TRIPS, patents received a fixed 17-year term measured from the date on which the
USPTO granted the patent application. After TRIPS, patent terms were increased to
20 years, but the start date was pushed earlier, back to the date the inventor applied
for the patent. So post-TRIPS, if patent prosecution took two years, then a patentee
would have 18 years of effective patent life, whereas if prosecution took four years,
then a patentee would have only 16 years of effective patent life.
TRIPS, therefore, changed applicant incentives with respect to patent prosecution.3
After TRIPS, every additional day an applicant took to obtain a patent was one less
3Abrams 2009 explored a somewhat different aspect of this legal change, noting that certain patent
classes have shorter average pendencies (time between patent application filing and patent issuance)
than others. He suggested these classes would benefit disproportionately from the change in law,
since they would receive longer patent term extensions on average due to the change in patent
term rules caused by TRIPS. He showed that innovation, as measured by unweighted and citation-
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day of patent duration that she received. As such, we would expect patentees in
industries in which term is especially important to respond to the change in law more
than applicants in industries that are less term sensitive.
Of course, an applicant might also prosecute a patent application quicker if she wishes
to obtain the patent sooner rather than later, perhaps because she wants to use it as
an asset or to persuade would-be investors for funding, or to advertise or promote the
product as patented as compared to patent pending. TRIPS, however, did not affect
this incentive – both before and after TRIPS, a patent’s effective term (i.e., the period
where it could be used to file suit) began only after the underlying patent application
issued. Hence, an applicant’s desire to obtain a patent quickly would have existed
both before and after TRIPS, which affected only when the patent term ended, not
when it began. Thus, applicants’ behavioral change after TRIPS was likely motivated
by the additional patent duration they could gain at the end of term by speeding up
prosecution.
Measuring this sensitivity to patent duration, however, is not as simple as measuring
changes in total pendency — that is, the total time between when a patent application
is filed and when it issues. Patent prosecution is a back-and-forth process — at some
points, it is the applicant’s turn to act and at others, it is the USPTO’s. So to
measure an applicant’s sensitivity to changes in term rules, we must apportion the
time an application is pending between the applicant and the patent office. Doing so
allows us to identify which industries care most about patent duration, as applicants
in that industry would respond most to the change in law.
weighted patent application counts, in fields with lower pendency increased disproportionately after
TRIPS relative to application counts in fields with longer prosecution times.
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To measure applicant delay, we obtained data on every issued patent filed in 1994-1996
using the USPTO’s Public PAIR (Patent Access Information Retrieval) database, as
compiled by the USPTO’s Office of the Chief Economist. This includes these patents’
transaction history, which details every substantive or procedural action taken by the
applicant or the USPTO.
After cleaning this dataset, we merged it with a patent dataset from NBER, described
in Hall et al. 2001, that categorizes issued patents into broader industry categories
based on patent classifications assigned by the USPTO during prosecution. Our final
dataset includes 304,512 first-time applications4 and 103,195 continuation applica-
tions (ones that claim priority to a previously filed parent patent applications).5
To illustrate how we apportion time between the USPTO and the applicant for each
patent, consider Figure 1, which shows a sample transaction history for U.S. Patent
No. 5,515,068, titled “One Chip Semiconductor Integrated Circuit Device Capable of
Outputting Analog Color Signal or Digital Color Signal.” After a patent application
is filed, the ball is in the USPTO’s court, as the applicant typically waits for the
agency to either issue a rejection or approve the patent claims. For most cases, the
first substantive action taken by the USPTO is a non-final rejection. Here, we can
see such a rejection was mailed by the agency on December 14, 1994. In our data,
4For a subset of first-time applications, we were able to supplement this data with attorney infor-
mation assembled by Google from the PAIR database. Including controls for whether a patentee
had an attorney or instead proceeded pro se (i.e., no registered attorney/agent was listed for the
application) does not appear to materially affect our results.
5Some continuation applications were filed after June 8, 1995 (the date TRIPS went into effect)
but claimed priority to an application filed before that date. Since these applications could claim
the benefit of the pre-TRIPS patent term rules, we treated them as filed under that regime in our
dataset.
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approximately 79.3% of patent applications received a non-final rejection like this at
some point during patent prosecution.
To avoid abandonment of the patent application, an applicant must respond to such a
rejection with an argument and/or an amendment to his patent claims, which define
his invention. Applicants are typically given three months from the date a non-final
rejection is mailed to file such a response, though they can pay a fee and request an
extension of up to three months, giving them up to six months total to respond. Here,
the applicant did not respond by the three-month deadline of March 14, 1995. Instead,
the applicant requested and received a three-month extension, filing his response on
June 14, 1995.
This back-and-forth process with the USPTO illustrates two ways of measuring appli-
cant delay. First, we can measure the time an applicant took to respond to a non-final
rejection, particularly the first non-final rejection she receives (since only a subset of
rejected applicants receive multiple non-final rejections).6 After TRIPS, every day an
applicant takes to respond to a patent office action results in one less day of patent
term. This was not true pre-TRIPS. So applicants should, on average, speed up their
response time to non-final rejections after TRIPS relative to before, with the effect
most pronounced for inventors who are most sensitive to patent term.
6Frakes and Wasserman 2013 use a related variable, the average amount of time that the patent
office takes to issue its first office action, as a measure of delay by the USPTO. They rely on annual
summary data, disaggregated at the patent class and entity size level (e.g., average amount of
time that the patent office took to issue a first office action for large-entity applicants filing patent
applications related to cryptography in 1997), and was obtained via Freedom of Information Act
requests.
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Second, we can measure how many extensions (if any) an applicant requested while
prosecuting an application. In particular, we should expect to see fewer extensions
requested by patent applicants when responding to non-final rejections post-TRIPS,
since extensions increase prosecution time and hence decrease patent term.7
Returning to the sample transaction history, we can see this patent application was
eventually granted, with the patent office mailing a notice of allowance on October
30, 1995. Before the patent could issue, however, the applicant was required to pay
an issue fee. An applicant has up to three months to pay an issue fee or else the
application is abandoned. Here, the USPTO recorded payment of the issue fee as
“Issue Fee Payment Verified” on January 30, 1996. Previous empirical work has
indicated the patent will then issue, on average, 6-8 weeks later (Crouch June 9,
2010). For our sample, we find the time between payment of the issue fee and patent
issuance is positively correlated (0.5780) with the time between mailing of the notice of
allowance and patent issuance. Figure 2 shows the nearly linear relationship between
when the issue fee is paid and the average time when the patent issues.8
7For present purposes, we are not considering applicant responses to “final” rejections by the
USPTO. The reason for this is that applicant responses to such rejections can be quite varied
and difficult to categorize. In response to final rejections, applicants might file something called
a “continuing prosecution application” — essentially, applicants pay an additional fee to get an-
other crack at prosecuting before the examiner. Alternatively, applicants might file an appeal
to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. An applicant might also abandon his patent
application.
8An applicant who plans to enforce her patent would have an incentive to pay her issue fee quickly,
even if she does not immediately plan on filing a lawsuit, because damages for patent infringement
are typically limited to infringing activities that occur after the patent has issued. So if an infringing
activity is already ongoing, a patentee increases the damages she could receive if her patent issues
faster.
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How long an applicant takes to pay an issue fee is thus a third way of measuring
applicant sensitivity to patent term. Post-TRIPS, if a patent applicant wants to
maximize her usable patent term, she will pay her issue fee quickly relative to what
she would have done pre-TRIPS.
So our baseline empirical strategy is clear — look at the average time that patent
applicants take to respond to non-final rejections, particularly their first non-final
rejection, and to pay their issue fees, and see if this average decreased after TRIPS.9
We can also add up both of these types of delay to create a combined measure,
which is what we do when creating our preferred measure of total applicant delay.
Alternatively, we can look at the number of extensions requested post-TRIPS and see
if that number decreased.
2.2 Summary Statistics and Non-Parametric Graphs
We begin with some summary statistics and non-parametric graphs to help describe
the data. Table 1 shows shows summary statistics for six different time periods –
January 1 through June 7, and June 8 through December 31, for 1994, 1995, and
1996. These time periods roughly divide the year into halves, with the effective date
on which TRIPS went into effect (June 8) as a dividing point. As can be seen, our
outcome variables of interest appear to show changes in the directions that would be
predicted (e.g., applicant delay spikes just before the change in law and then shows a
sustained decrease). These results will later be confirmed in our regression analysis.
9In most specifications we use the time that applicants took to respond to the first non-final rejection
they received. Our results remain the same, however, if we instead use the total time they took
to respond to all non-final rejections and include a control for the number of office actions they
received.
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Figure 3 shows how application pendency — the total time between patent applica-
tion filing and patent application issuance — and applicant delay — the measure of
time attributable to applicants during prosecution that we created using a detailed
transaction history for each patent — evolved for patent applications filed between
1994 and 1996. A few trends stand out.10
First, we can see a spike in both application pendency and applicant delay just before
June 8, 1995, which is the date TRIPS went into effect. The spike can be explained by
TRIPS itself, which provided that any application filed prior to June 8, 1995, would
receive the longer of 17 years from patent issuance and 20 years from application
filing.11 Accordingly, some applicants might have taken advantage of this provision
by choosing to file patent applications with longer expected pendencies prior to the
change in law.12 We are mindful of these spikes and, as we discuss in detail below,
account for selection around this date through a variety of alternate specifications in
which we exclude applications filed around this date.
Second, we can see a steady increase in application pendency in 1994 and into 1995.
By contrast, applicant delay remains relatively flat during this time. This divergence
10Since our preferred measure of applicant delay is the sum of the time that an applicant took to
respond to a first non-final rejection plus the time he took to pay the issue fee, all graphs here are
limited to the 323,256 issued applications that received at least one non-final rejection.
11In related work, we are conducting a stock market event study to measure how the retroactive
application of TRIPS to previously-filed patents affected the values of patent-intensive firms.
12Some of these might be so-called “submarine patents,” which are patent applications that inven-
tors deliberately keep pending for a very long time. Lemley 1994. When such patents finally
emerge from prosecution, they typically enter an already-mature industry in which competitors
are susceptible to “patent hold-up,” in which they must license the technology or else pay large
fixed costs to redesign existing systems around the infringing technology.
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between application pendency (which includes delays attributable to the patent office
as well as applicants) and applicant delay (which includes just applicant-induced
delays) suggests that increases in pendency during these years were primarily driven
by changes at the USPTO (i.e., the agency was taking longer to examine applications)
rather than changes in applicant behavior.
Third, we see both pendency and applicant delay drop sharply after June 8, 1995,
and then become quite stable, with perhaps a slight decrease over time. Thus, the
graphs suggest there was a trend break in both pendency and applicant delay around
June 8, 1995.
Finally, further visual evidence of the effect of TRIPS is shown in Appendix Figure
A.1, which shows coefficients for month dummies (with standard error bands) between
January 1994 and December 1996, when regressed on applicant delay. We can see a
spike in June 1995 (month 18 in the graph), when TRIPS went into effect, followed
by a sustained drop afterward.
We might wonder whether the apparent trend break in June 1995 affected only cer-
tain categories of inventions, or whether its effect is more widespread. Figure 4 and
Appendix Figure A.2 show changes in applicant delay and pendency, respectively, by
NBER category. Appendix Figure A.2 shows that pendency was increasing across all
categories prior to the law change, and it appears to stabilize or drop slightly across
most categories after TRIPS goes into effect. Figure 4 shows that applicant delay
drops significantly, particularly for the Drugs & Medical, Computers & Communica-
tions, and Chemicals categories. The Mechanical and Others categories appear to be
the least affected groups, and Electrical & Electronics falls in the middle. We will
discuss these results in more detail in section 2.5 below.
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We can also test for a trend break due to TRIPS using non-parametric methods.
Appendix Figure A.3 shows local polynomials with standard error bands that plot
applicant delay relative to time. The polynomial on the left runs from January
1, 1994, to June 7, 1995; the polynomial on the right runs from June 8, 1995, to
December 31, 1996. The left-hand polynomial tips upward prior to the cut date,
suggesting some applicants chose to file some especially long pendency applications
during this time. But there is still a significant break between the two graphs, where
the local polynomial after June 8 is significantly lower than the polynomial before June
8. Moreover, applicant delay drops precipitously after June 8, suggesting applicants
quickly changed their behavior and sped up patent prosecution under the new regime.
2.3 Results Using Applicant Delay Measure
To validate the suggestive graphical evidence discussed above, we present a number
of ordinary least squares regressions that test how applicant behavior changed around
the passage of TRIPS. Table 2 shows the effect of TRIPS on our preferred measure
of applicant behavior, applicant delay.13 In particular, our “Post-TRIPS” dummy
13Apart from a few outliers, applicant delay is not highly skewed, with an overall mean of 189.75 and
standard deviation of 76.88 for the 323,256 applications that received at least one office action.
Indeed, only 2,332 of these observations (0.721%) have applicant delays that exceed 500 days. The
two components of our applicant delay measure also do not appear highly skewed — the amount of
time applicants take to respond to a first office action has a mean of 112.45 and standard deviation
of 56.40 for 323,356 applications; and the time applicants take to make the final issue fee payment
has a mean of 77.27 and standard deviation of 48.27 for 407,707 applications. As such, we keep
applicant delay in levels for our preferred specifications. Nonetheless, we also show various log
specifications for robustness and because those specifications allow for straightforward percentage
point comparisons across invention categories.
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variable specifies whether a patent application was filed on or after June 8, 1995,
when the new patent term regime went into effect. In our most parsimonious model
presented in column (1), applicant delay is regressed on a Post-TRIPS dummy. We
see the average applicant delay fell by about 8.03 days (4.16%) following TRIPS.
In columns (3), (4), (7), and (8), log applicant delay is instead the dependent variable
(with all coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100). This specification enables
us to interpret the change in applicant prosecution speed as a percentage point change.
Looking at columns (3) and (4), we can see that applicant delay overall fell by about
4.2 to 4.6 percentage points following TRIPS.
Due to possible concerns about selection around the implementation of TRIPS, we
also present specifications where we exclude periods when one might worry most
about changed applicant behavior. Our results remain highly significant and of a
similar order of magnitude when we exclude the period between December 8, 1994
(when TRIPS was enacted) and August 8, 1995 (two months after it went into effect)
— see columns (2), (4), (6), and (8).14
In columns (5)-(8), we add numerous controls. Because an applicant’s prosecution
behavior might depend on the number of back-and-forth interactions he has with the
patent office, we include controls for the number of non-final office actions and number
of restriction requirements15 for each patent application. In addition, we add fixed-
14Our results remain robust when we exclude larger windows, such as when we exclude all of the
data from 1995.
15An examiner issues a restriction requirement when an applicant claims more than one “independent
and distinct invention in a single application,” and when the patent examiner would face a “serious
burden” if forced to examine each of these inventions. In our data, 10.85% of patent applications
received a restriction requirement at some point during patent prosecution.
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effects for patent assignee (essentially a firm fixed effect),16 and patent class (i.e.,
type of invention as classified by the USPTO). We also control for the amount of
delay attributable to the patent office (remainder), by subtracting the total applicant
delay (i.e., the total time the ball was in the applicant’s court) from the pendency of
the application. In these specifications, we further control for whether the applicant
is a small entity, which affects the magnitude of fees charged by the USPTO, and
whether the patentee was from the United States. Moreover, including interactions
of the various controls described here or including fixed effects for patentee’s country
of origin do not appear to materially change the results.
In addition, we control for whether an application claimed priority to a previous
patent application. Applications that are continuations of earlier applications (con-
tinuation), that are national stage applications based on previous foreign or Patent
Cooperation Treaty filings (nat’l stage), or that are appealed to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (appealed) appear to have longer applicant delays. Divi-
sional applications (filed in response to a restriction requirement) have shorter appli-
cant delays.17
In response to a restriction, a patent applicant must file an election in which the applicant chooses
which invention to pursue in the present application. Additionally, the applicant may traverse,
or dispute the restriction, and he may also pursue the other inventions, if desired, in separate
divisional applications. The applicant is generally given one month to respond from the date the
restriction requirement is mailed, although the applicant can pay a fee and request an extension
of up to five months, giving him up to a total of six months to respond.
162.38% of all observations (9,714 of 407,707) have more than one assignee. These patents are
excluded in regressions that include assignee fixed effects; results are similar if these assignees are
included.
17Note that our results remain robust if we exclude all applications that claim priority.
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The inclusion of the controls substantially reduces our applicant delay coefficient
across all specifications. We can see this coefficient decreases from -8.03 to -3.32 for
the specifications that include all filings, and from -8.69 to -2.97 for the specifications
that exclude the inner window. In our log specifications, the controls reduce the
applicant delay coefficient from -4.21 to -1.64 for the specifications that include all
filings, and from -4.62 to -1.46 for the specifications that exclude the inner window.
We are mindful that some of these controls might instead be considered outcome
variables. For example, we might expect some applicants were less likely to seek a
continuation after TRIPS, since doing so would now reduce patent term. Regardless,
our coefficient remains significant and negative across all specifications. While our
full covariate specifications in columns (5)-(8) are the preferred specifications we use
in our later graphs and analysis, we also present results throughout the paper and
in our Appendix using our more parsimonious specifications in columns (1)-(4). We
find our results largely unchanged depending on the specification we choose, which
provides more support for the robustness of our results.
One might be concerned that the above results were driven by a downward time trend
in our preferred measure of applicant delay. We can control for this possibility by
including time variables in our OLS regressions. These specifications, which we show
in Table 3, include both linear and quadratic time variables. To test for a trend break
we also include interactions of time and time*time with Post-TRIPS in our original
models. The coefficient on Post-TRIPS remains negative across all specifications; it
is statistically significant at the 5% level for the specification in column 1, nearly
significant at the 5% level for the specification in column 2, and not significant for
the specification in column 3. At any rate, the statistic of interest is the F-test
which tests for equality between the Post-TRIPS variable and its interactions with
19
time, a continuation of trend. The null hypotheses are rejected handily in all three
specifications. This outcome also holds for the individual applicant delay components,
helping to allay possible concerns about divergent trends influencing our results.
2.4 Results Using Disaggregated Measures of Applicant De-
lay
To verify applicants sped up prosecution over the entirety of patent prosecution,
Tables 4 and 5 present the outcome of similar regression analyses on disaggregated
measures of applicant delay. Table 4 focuses on extension requests from patent appli-
cants. An extension request (which is almost always granted) provides an individual
extra months to respond to a patent office action, such as a non-final office action or
restriction requirement. So cutting down on extensions is a clear way for an applicant
to decrease prosecution time.
Looking at the raw data, 40.05% of pre-TRIPS applicants requested extensions, as
compared to 36.27% of post-TRIPS applicants. Columns (1) through (3) present OLS
results showing that the average number of extensions fell after TRIPS. Columns
(4) through (6) present the marginal effects of logistic regressions on whether an
applicant applied for at least one extension. Once again the coefficient on Post-
TRIPS is negative and highly significant, suggesting that the share of applications
with an extension fell by 3.0 to 4.1 percentage points.
In Table 5, we see other measures of applicant delay also decreased on average after
TRIPS went into effect. Columns (1) to (3) show that applicants after TRIPS on
average responded significantly faster to non-final office actions, conditional on having
received one. Applicants also paid their issue fees sooner, as shown in columns (4)
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to (6). In columns (7) to (9), the outcome variable is whether an application is a
continuation of a previous application. We can see applicants are less likely to file
continuations post-TRIPS – this makes sense, as the marginal cost of a continuation
would be higher after TRIPS, since it would result in a shorter patent term. These
results remain highly statistically significant across different time periods and with
the inclusion of the same rich set of controls and fixed effects as described above.
Taken together, these different measures of applicant delay give a consistent picture:
applicants sped up numerous facets of patent prosecution in response to TRIPS.
2.5 Cross-Industry Differences in Applicant Behavior
We now see how applicants in different industries varied in their response to TRIPS.
When assembling the NBER dataset, Hall et al. 2001 consolidated the over 400 classes
used by the USPTO to categorize inventions into 37 subcategories and six categories.
Figure 5 below shows coefficients for the Post-TRIPS dummy variable with standard
error bars for these six categories — Chemicals, Computers & Communications, Drugs
& Medical, Electrical & Electronics, Mechanical, and Others (a residual category).
We present results using our full set of controls, with both applicant delay and log
applicant delay as the outcome variables of interest, as used in the specifications in
columns (5)-(8) of Table 2.
As Figure 5 shows, the largest effect (most significant decrease in applicant delay)
appears to be in the Drugs & Medical and Computers & Communications categories,
followed by the Chemical, Others and Electrical & Electronics categories. The Me-
chanical category appears to have been affected relatively little by TRIPS, suggesting
that applicants in that category were less sensitive to the change in patent term
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rules. We see the results are largely similar, though with reduced magnitudes, when
we exclude data from December 8, 1994, to August 8, 1995.
One gets a clearer picture of cross-industry differences by looking at the 37 compo-
nent subcategories of the six larger categories. Table 6 shows Post-TRIPS coefficients
for these groups, again looking at the coefficients based on specifications (5)-(8) from
Table 2. We can see that coefficients vary across specifications, but by and large, the
most negative coefficients are for Communications, Computer Hardware and Soft-
ware, Drugs, Electrical Lighting, Electronic Business Methods and Software, Genetics,
Measuring and Testing, Organic Compounds, and Semiconductor Devices.18 While
patents are typically thought of as being important for some of these categories, most
subcategories in Computers and Communications also have large negative coefficients.
These results are a bit more surprising, as the value of computers and particularly
software is conventionally thought to be less dependent on patent law than other
technological areas.19
2.6 Cross-Check Using Patent Count Measure
As noted previously, selection around the date TRIPS went into effect (June 8, 1995),
is a potential concern. But one could instead view selection as yet another measure
18As additional robustness checks, Appendix Table A.1 presents results when we instead run the
same analysis using the specifications without controls as shown in columns (1)-(4) of Table 2.
19While our results suggest some software patents have more long-term value than is conventionally
believed, it’s not clear why this is true. It’s possible this value might stem from the broader and
more ambiguous scope of some of these patents, which allow them to be useful in litigation even
when the underlying invention has become obsolete. In other words, it is possible some software
patents have long-term private value yet are socially deleterious.
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of applicant sensitivity to patent term. Put differently, industries in which selection
is greater might be the same industries in which applicants care more about patent
term. If so, this sort of selection-based measure should correlate with our post-TRIPS
measure, which also measures cross-industry differences in patent term sensitivity.20
In constructing a selection-based measure, we use patent counts — namely, the num-
ber of patent applications filed in a particular industry category within a fixed period
of time. One plausible measure of selection is the number of patent applications filed
before TRIPS went into effect. As Figure 6 shows, the number of patent applications
spiked across all patent categories in the week prior to June 8, 1995, suggesting that
many inventors filed applications just before the new patent term regime took effect.
The size of this spike varied greatly across categories — for example, Drugs & Medical
applications increased nearly 52-fold, from an average of 53.75 per day in November
1994 to 2,783 on June 7, 1995, the day before TRIPS went into effect. By contrast,
Computers and Communications grew from about 116.22 per day to 1712 (nearly
15-fold increase) and Mechanical went from about 95.94 per day to 989 (over 10-fold
increase) during that same period. The heterogeneity across categories shows patent
applicants in different industries reacted differently to TRIPS.
To normalize our patent count measure, we divide the number of patent filings per
category by the number of filings from the same time period in the previous year.
More formally, our patent count measure is:
Counti =
# of patent apps. in category i (6/1/95−6/7/95)
# of patent apps. in category i (6/1/94−6/7/94)
20We thank Michael Frakes for this insight.
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Our patent count measure is shown for each NBER subcategory in the last column of
Table 6. This measure is negatively correlated with our primary measure of applicant
delay, the post-TRIPS coefficient, regardless of the specifications we use from Table
2.21 This means the industries in which applicants sped up prosecution post-TRIPS
are by and large the same industries whose application filings increased the most in
the week prior to TRIPS’ effective date of June 8, 1995, as compared to filings from
a year earlier. The correlation between these measures provides another cross-check
that our post-TRIPS coefficient accurately captures cross-industry differences in term
sensitivity.
2.7 Other Changes in TRIPS
The change in term rules was TRIPS’ most significant change to patent law, which
we believe drove the changes we observe in applicant behavior. Nonetheless, we also
check whether other changes initiated by TRIPS (Van Horn 1995) might affect our
results here. First, TRIPS changed rules relating to establishing an invention date by
allowing (for the first time) applicants to establish patent priority based on inventive
activity outside of the United States, not just limited to the filing of an international
application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty or the filing of a foreign patent
application. This seems unlikely to systematically affect the prosecution time of
applicants. Regardless, controlling for the country of origin of the patent applicant
21Specifically, the correlations are: -0.72, -0.68, -0.73, -0.67, -0.44, -0.42, -0.42, -0.37 between the
count measure and the post-TRIPS coefficient obtained based on the specifications in columns (1)-
(8), respectively, of Table 2. All correlations except for those generated based on columns (6) and
(8) are statistically significant at the 1% level; those two correlations are statistically significant
at the 5% significance level.
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(something we tested in unreported specifications) should capture at least some of
this effect, and it did not substantially affect our results.
TRIPS also allowed patentees to obtain extensions to their patent term in certain
limited situations — when patent issuance is delayed due to an interference proceeding
(where two separate inventors dispute who invented first and go through an extensive
regulatory process to determine who has priority), a secrecy order (which requires a
patent prosecution to remain secret if a government agency believes it to be in the
interests of national security), and a successful appellate review. Interferences are
very rare — between 1991 and 1994, there were only 718 interferences, much less
than 1% of all applications (Calvert and Sofocleous 1995). Secrecy orders appear
to be even rarer (at least prior to September 11, 2001), and most of these cases are
unlikely to appear in our sample. And appeals involve relatively few cases, with even
fewer being reversed (e.g., in fiscal year 1998, there were 3,779 appeals received and
only 1,239 reversed (U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 1998)). About 5.59% of the
patents in our sample (22,808 out of 407,707) appear to been appealed at some point.
At any rate, our results remain robust when we either exclude or control for cases
involving appeals.
TRIPS also created a new type of patent application known as a provisional patent
application, which is a simplified application (typically without formal claims) that
establishes a priority date for the applicant. Provisional applications do not extend
patent term; they simply provide a placeholder for applicants to follow up within one
year with a standard, non-provisional application. An applicant who files a provisional
and then a follow-up non-provisional within one year gets the priority date of the
provisional filing, but receives the standard term of 20 years from the filing of the
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non-provisional application. Provisional applications that are not followed up with a
non-provisional application are abandoned.
One concern might be if applicants who systematically differ in delay chose to file
provisional instead of non-provisional applications after TRIPS. For example, perhaps
applicants who wanted to delay the start of prosecution post-TRIPS filed provisional
applications instead of non-provisionals. If we looked at only non-provisionals and
ignored the provisionals, we would introduce a selection bias in our results.
There are reasons to believe this is not an issue here. First, provisional patent ap-
plications were not common in the period right after TRIPS was enacted. If many
applicants preferred to wait until TRIPS went into effect to file provisional applica-
tions, we would likely see a spike of applications after that date. But in our sample,
we observe only 111 issued patents filed in 1995 and 3,622 issued patents filed in 1996
that claim priority to provisional applications. These are small numbers compared to
the 285,523 issued patents filed in 1995-96 in our sample. Moreover, including these
applications in our sample, with or without controls, or excluding them altogether
does not meaningfully change our results.
3 Cross-Validation of Measure of Marginal Patent
Term Value
We now compare our cross-industry measure of marginal term value with other patent
value measures. This cross-validation exercise provides further support that our ap-
proach credibly measures patent term sensitivity.
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3.1 Maintenance Fees as a Measure of Late-Term Patent
Value
One might expect that applicants who speed up prosecution the most in response to
TRIPS do so because they have the most to gain at the end of their patent term.
Intuitively, if applicants in a certain industry systematically expect their underlying
inventions to be valuable far into the future, those applicants would be incentivized
to delay prosecution in the pre-TRIPS era, so that their patents would issue later.
After TRIPS, this distortion would be removed, causing such applicants to speed up
prosecution relative to applicants in other industries.
Here, we empirically show how our measure of prosecution “speed up” relates to a
different measure of late-term patent value: the proportion of patents within invention
categories that do not lapse for failure to pay patent maintenance fees (also known
as patent renewal fees). As background, the USPTO requires applicants to pay three






years after patent issuance. If a patentee
does not pay these fees, then his patent will lapse, which means its term will end
immediately rather than at its scheduled time. The amount of maintenance fees is







-year maintenance fees, respectively.22 If a patent assignee qualifies as
a “small entity” — that is, if it is an individual, or a small business or non-profit
organization that meet certain criteria — then these fees are halved. About 25% of
patents issued between 1981 and 2000 qualified for “small entity” status.
Scholars have long used data on maintenance fee payments as a measure of patent
valuation. (e.g., Lanjouw et al. 1998a, Schankerman 1998, Allison et al. 2003, Moore
2235 U.S.C. § 41 (1995).
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2005, Bessen 2008, Pakes and Schankerman 1984, Pakes 1986). The idea is that
if a patentee chooses to pay a maintenance fee, we can infer the patentee believes
the expected benefit from keeping the patent alive exceeds the present cost of the
maintenance fee. More specifically, maintenance fees tell us something about dis-
counted expected profits from patents toward the end of their term. For example, a
profit-maximizing patentee would renew a patent at 111
2
years only if the discounted
expected value of future profits stemming from the patent exceeds the maintenance
fee payment at that time.
Accordingly, we can use maintenance fee payments as a rough measure of the rela-
tive value of patents across industries, particularly their late-term patent value. For
example, if pharmaceutical patents are more likely to be maintained on average than
mechanical patents, then we might conclude that pharmaceutical patents are on aver-
age more valuable than mechanical patents. Of course, this conclusion only holds true
for patents near the top end of the patent value distribution — that is, those patents
whose value exceeds the maintenance fee threshold amount. It might not hold true for
less valuable patents within a patent category. In short, maintenance fees cannot tell
us the precise distribution of patent values within industries (Abrams et al. April 8,
2013). Nonetheless, a higher rate of renewal within an industry category, particularly
at the 111
2
year date, suggests that on average, patents in that industry are worth
more toward the end of their term than in industries with lower renewal rates. So
we might expect to see some correlation between industries that have higher renewal
rates and industries in which applicants sped up prosecution the most in response to
TRIPS.
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The data in Table 6 show the percentage of patents filed between 1994 and 1996 that
were maintained through 111
2
years within the 37 subcategories described above.23 It
also shows the post-TRIPS coefficients using our specifications in columns (5) , (6),
(7), and (8) of Table 2. Figure 7 also shows our results graphically in a scatterplot.
Even though there are only 37 subcategories, we see a strong and significant nega-
tive correlation between the maintenance fee measure and our measures of applicant
delay.24 This suggests patentees who are most likely to maintain their patents are
in the same industries as the patent applicants who sped up prosecution the most in
response to TRIPS. We find similar strong correlations when we compare our measure
with patent renewal rates from other years.
The correlation between our measure of patent delay and the renewal rate within a
particular industry supports our model of patenting behavior. Namely, patent classes
that are most likely to be maintained — and hence, have the highest profit remaining
near the end of term — are the same patent classes whose applicants responded the
most to TRIPS. In other words, the correlation between these measures suggests that
post-TRIPS, applicants who had more profits to lose at the end of their patent term
were the ones most likely to speed up patent prosecution.
23To isolate the late-term hazard, we also tested how our post-TRIPS coefficient correlates with the
11 12 year renewal rate conditional on a patent being renewed at 7
1
2 years. When we conduct this
robustness check, we find substantially the same correlations and results as in our analysis here.
24Specifically, the correlations are: -0.44, -0.50, -0.35, -0.39, -0.33, -0.45, -0.23, -0.31 between percent
maintained and the post-TRIPS coefficient obtained based on the specifications in columns (1)-
(8), respectively, of Table 2. The correlations based on columns (1), (2), and (6) are statistically
significant at the 1% level; the correlations based on columns (3), (4), and (5) are statistically
significant at the 5% level; and the correlation based on column (8) is statistically significant at
the 10% level.
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An advantage of our approach is that it is a more complete measure of patent value
than maintenance fees. As noted, the latter only tell us if a patentee valued her
invention more than the (relatively low) cost of the renewal and do not necessarily
inform us of the full distribution of patent values absent further assumptions.
3.2 Survey-Based Measure Based on Cohen et al. 2000 and
Arora et al. 2008
Finally, we compare our patent term sensitivity measure with a survey-based measure
introduced in Cohen et al. 2000 and used in Arora et al. 2008. In Cohen et al. 2000,
the authors surveyed 1,478 R&D laboratories, who reported the relative importance
of patents for their firms. The authors found that patents were particularly important
for blocking rivals from producing substitutes in chemical industries, and as negoti-
ating levers in the telecommunications and semiconductor industries. In Arora et al.
2008, the authors applied this survey data to a structural model to calculate an un-
conditional expected premium for patents in 19 broad invention categories, as well as
an expected premium conditional on patenting in those areas.
The authors provided SIC classifications for 17 of these invention categories.25 We
used this mapping to match these categories with their corresponding 1997 North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) classifications via a concordance
provided by the U.S. Census.26 This resulted in 491 NAICS groups, some of which
25The paper lumped together two categories — drugs and medicines, and biotech — when mapping
to SIC classifications, so we averaged these categories in our analysis below. The paper also did
not provide SIC classifications for one category, “Other Electrical Equipment.”
26Available at https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html.
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mapped to multiple invention categories. To reduce these multiple mappings, we
associated NAICS groups that matched a more specific category (e.g., “Rubber”)
with that category if that same group also matched a more general residual category
(e.g., “Other Chemicals”). We dropped the remaining groups that spanned multiple
invention categories and ended up with 469 unique NAICS-invention group mappings.
Next, we relied on Lybbert and Zolas 2014, which provides a cross-walk between 1997
NAICS classifications and U.S. patent classifications (USPCs). Specifically, the cross-
walk generates a probability distribution for each NAICS group over various USPCs.
We then calculated regression coefficients for our applicant delay measure using the
specifications in columns 1 and 5 of Table 2 for each USPC group with at least 100
patents in our sample. Using the probability distributions in Lybbert and Zolas 2014,
we aggregated the coefficients to create a coefficient for each NAICS group. Finally,
because most invention categories contained multiple NAICS groups, we aggregated
across these groups to obtain a coefficient at the invention group level. We used equal
weights across NAICS groups for this step.
The final results of our analysis are presented in Table 7, and shown graphically in
Figure 8. Even with just 17 invention categories, our measure of marginal patent term
value is negatively correlated with the patent premium measures at at least the 10%
significance level (-0.478 and -0.490 for the coefficient from column 1, and -0.429 and -
0.430 for the coefficient from column 5 for the unconditional and conditional expected
patent premium measures, respectively). This suggests the invention categories in
which applicants sped up most due to TRIPS were the same categories that Arora
et al. 2008 identified as having higher patent value.
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Our approach differs from Cohen et al. 2000 and Arora et al. 2008 in that we directly
measure the behavioral response of patentees to a change in patent term rules. This
enables us to measure the marginal value of patent duration at a much finer-grained
level. Still, that our results correlate with these previous studies bolsters our claim
that our method accurately measures the private value of patents.
4 Conclusion
We use a rare natural experiment to measure how sensitive patentees in different
industries are to a change in patent term rules. In particular, we examine how ap-
plicants in different industries differentially sped up patent prosecution in response
to the TRIPS agreement, which decreased patent length one day for every day the
patent was prosecuted.
To calculate this measure, we construct a novel dataset based on the transaction histo-
ries of 407,707 issued patents filed between 1994 and 1996. We apportion prosecution
time between the patent office and applicant, thereby creating the first comprehensive
measure of applicant prosecution time. We find that applicants in different industries
varied greatly in their response to the law. Our results generally support previous
theory, though computer and software products appear more sensitive to patent term
than was perhaps previously appreciated.
These results are robust across many specifications. We deal with potential selection
around the date TRIPS went into effect by excluding various inner windows around
that date. We also exploit any selection itself as an independent cross-industry mea-
sure of term sensitivity, and find it is correlated with our applicant delay measure.
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Finally, we find that our applicant delay measure significantly correlates with the rate
at which patents are maintained across industries, as well as self-reported, industry-
based measures of patent value, as introduced in Cohen et al. 2000 and used in
Arora et al. 2008. This cross-validation gives us further confidence we have credibly
measured the marginal value of patent term across industries through the behavioral
response of patentees to a change in term rules.
Figures
Figure 1: Sample Transaction History
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Figure 2: Issue Fee Payment Date and Average Patent Issuance Date
Notes: This figure compares issue fee payment date and average patent issuance date, both measured
from the date a notice of allowance was mailed. It shows a local polynomial regression using an
Epanechnikov kernel of degree 0 and a one-week bandwidth and is based on data from 547,424
patents issued in 1994-1998. The graph excludes 2.31% of patents (12,642 of 547,424) for which the
time between the mailing of the notice of allowance and the issue fee payment exceeded 100 days.
Such applications likely correspond to extraordinary cases, such as where applicants failed to pay
their issue fee in a timely manner and had to petition the USPTO for late payment. Regardless,
a similar, nearly linear relationship appears when graphing dates corresponding to these excluded
patents.
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Figure 3: Application Pendency and Applicant Delay: 1994-1996
Notes: This graph shows how application pendency (i.e., total amount of time application was
pending at the USPTO from filing to issuance) and applicant delay (i.e., time to respond to first
non-final office action rejection plus the time taken to pay the issue fee) changed from January 1,
1994, through December 31, 1996. The left y-axis is in days of applicant delay; the right y-axis is
in days of pendency. “0” represents June 8, 1995, when the new TRIPS regime went into effect.
The gray area around each line represents 95% confidence interval bands. The local polynomial
regressions use an Epanechnikov kernel of degree 0 and bandwidth of 14.
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Figure 4: Applicant Delay by Category
Notes: This graph shows how applicant delay (i.e., time to respond to first non-final office action
rejection plus the time taken to pay the issue fee) changed for technologies broken down by NBER
category from January 1, 1994, through December 31, 1996. The local polynomial regression is
conducted using an Epanechnikov kernel of degree 0 and bandwidth of 14. “0” represents June 8,
1995, when the new TRIPS regime went into effect.
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Figure 5: Cross-Industry Differences in Applicant Delay (Post-TRIPS Coefficient)
Notes: This graph shows category-level coefficients with standard error bars for the Post-TRIPS
dummy variable from specifications in columns (5), (6), (7) and (8) of Table 2. The dependent
variable is applicant delay for entries marked 5 and 6 and log applicant delay for entries marked 7
and 8 (both the coefficient and the error bands have been multiplied by 100 for the log specifications).
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Figure 6: Number of Applications Filed by NBER Category
Notes: This graph shows a local polynomial regression of the number of patent applications filed per
day by NBER category around the passage of TRIPS. The regression uses an Epanechnikov kernel
of degree 0 and bandwidth of 1, centered on June 8, 1995.
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Figure 7: Post-TRIPS Coefficient v. Percent Maintained by NBER Subcategory
Notes: This scatterplot plots by NBER category the post-TRIPS coefficient calculated using the
specification in col. (5) of Table 2 versus the percent of patents maintained through 11 1/2 years
for patent applications filed in 1994-1996.
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Figure 8: Patent Premiums in Arora et al. 2008 v. Post-TRIPS Coefficient
Notes: This scatterplot plots the Expected Patent Premium and Conditional Patent Premium from
Arora et al. 2008 table 7 versus the post-TRIPS coefficient calculated using the specification in col.




Table 1: Summary Statistics
1994 1995 1996 All
01/01-06/08 06/09-12/31 01/01-06/08 06/09-12/31 01/01-06/08 06/09-12/31 1994-1996
# OAs 0.98 0.97 1.01 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98
(0.68) (0.68) (0.72) (0.69) (0.71) (0.74) (0.71)
# Restricts. 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
(0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
Small Entity 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25
(0.45) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Pro Se 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Remainder 538.37 560.66 628.02 632.97 634.35 620.14 605.12
(365.30) (354.79) (398.15) (330.77) (318.31) (310.91) (349.50)
U.S. Patentee 0.55 0.53 0.59 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.54
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
# Claims 14.23 14.46 15.22 14.99 15.51 15.68 15.06
(11.74) (11.55) (13.55) (11.89) (12.26) (12.46) (12.33)
# Citations 10.48 10.20 9.37 9.12 8.80 8.38 9.32
(16.25) (16.32) (14.97) (14.53) (13.93) (13.19) (14.84)
Continuation 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.13
(0.36) (0.36) (0.39) (0.30) (0.31) (0.32) (0.34)
Divisional 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07
(0.24) (0.24) (0.36) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.26)
Nat’l Stage 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23)
Provisional 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.09) (0.19) (0.10)
Appealed 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.06
(0.17) (0.17) (0.23) (0.21) (0.25) (0.29) (0.23)
App. Delay 188.42 189.57 196.49 186.64 187.52 188.17 189.75
(74.00) (80.18) (81.29) (74.68) (74.78) (73.92) (76.88)
Ln. App. Delay 5.18 5.18 5.21 5.16 5.17 5.18 5.18
(0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37)
Pendency 725.06 747.75 826.37 814.43 817.96 805.49 792.59
(416.11) (405.80) (461.55) (384.40) (372.99) (368.18) (404.89)
# Extensions 0.57 0.56 0.72 0.54 0.58 0.60 0.60
(0.95) (0.95) (1.17) (0.96) (1.00) (1.04) (1.03)
Extended? 0.38 0.38 0.43 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49)
Non-Final OA Delay 108.29 109.25 119.94 105.46 107.48 108.53 110.19
(98.32) (101.76) (114.85) (97.97) (101.54) (102.79) (103.73)
Issue Fee Delay 78.40 77.84 78.41 75.99 76.13 76.82 77.27
(48.14) (49.14) (49.01) (49.12) (47.59) (46.67) (48.27)
Observations 49,503 72,681 78,278 64,277 56,806 86,162 407,707
Notes : This table shows summary statistics for various patent characteristics for six different time periods in our dataset:
January 1 through June 7, and June 8 through December 31, for 1994, 1995, and 1996. The characteristics summarized
include: the average number of non-final office actions and restriction requirements issued by the patent office; the
probability that an applicant was a small entity or was proceeding pro se; the average number of patent claims; the
average number of backward citations to patents from other patents issued up through 2006; the probability an application
claimed priority to another patent application as a continuation, divisional, national stage, or provisional application; the
probability that an applicant appealed an adverse decision by the patent office; the probability that the applicant sought
an extension when responding to a non-final office action and the average number of extensions sought; and variables
related to applicant delay and pendency. Standard deviations are in ( ).
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Table 2: Effect of TRIPS on Applicant Delay and Log Applicant Delay
Delay Delay Log Delay Log Delay Delay Delay Log Delay Log Delay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post-TRIPS -8.034*** -8.685*** -4.213*** -4.615*** -3.316*** -2.966*** -1.636*** -1.463***
(0.271) (0.302) (0.131) (0.144) (0.686) (0.809) (0.378) (0.443)
# OAs – – – – -0.947** -0.939** -0.241 -0.256
(0.422) (0.454) (0.188) (0.200)
# Restricts. – – – – 2.429*** 2.850*** 1.238*** 1.385***
(0.523) (0.608) (0.232) (0.268)
Small Entity – – – – 2.054 2.526* 1.712*** 1.991***
(1.300) (1.455) (0.603) (0.708)
Remainder – – – – 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
U.S. Patentee – – – – 3.524 -0.490 -0.699 -2.217
(6.331) (6.362) (2.661) (2.927)
# Claims – – – – 0.148*** 0.157*** 0.068*** 0.072***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.011) (0.012)
# Citations – – – – -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.053*** -0.053***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009)
Continuation – – – – 4.113*** 4.699*** 1.880*** 2.237***
(0.683) (0.754) (0.342) (0.381)
Divisional – – – – -2.172*** -1.401* -1.550*** -1.187***
(0.741) (0.792) (0.352) (0.381)
Nat’l Stage – – – – 4.689*** 5.835*** 2.550*** 3.109***
(1.100) (1.299) (0.490) (0.583)
Provisional – – – – 3.133 3.768* 3.107*** 3.476***
(1.959) (2.254) (0.917) (1.059)
Appealed – – – – 16.392*** 15.414*** 7.177*** 6.910***
(1.495) (1.540) (0.651) (0.680)
Constant 193.070*** 193.687*** 519.892*** 520.296*** 198.534*** 205.056*** 520.538*** 523.392***
(0.181) (0.216) (0.084) (0.099) (11.132) (13.179) (4.786) (5.316)
Years 1994-96 No inner 1994-96 No inner 1994-96 No inner 1994-96 No inner
window window window window
Fixed Eff. No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.172 0.170 0.268 0.265
Obs. 323,256 254,454 323,256 254,454 265,639 209,766 265,639 209,766
Notes : Dependent variable is applicant delay in cols. (1), (2), (5) and (6), which is the sum of the time that an applicant
took to respond to a first non-final rejection plus the time between when the notice of allowance was mailed and the
issue fee was paid. Dependent variable is log applicant delay in cols. (3), (4), (7), and (8), and coefficients and standard
errors are multiplied by 100 in those columns. Robust standard errors in cols. (1)-(4); clustered standard errors at
patent assignee level in cols. (5)-(8). Fixed effects are for patent assignee and patent class. Cols. (2), (4), (6), (8)
exclude applications filed 12/8/94-8/8/95 (between date of TRIPS enactment to two months after TRIPS went into
effect). Remainder = amount of prosecution delay attributable to the patent office. All other variables are as described
in the text. *** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
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Table 3: Effect of TRIPS on Applicant Delay with Time Trend Corrections
Delay Delay Delay
(1) (2) (3)
Post-TRIPS -11.806*** -1.552* -1.458
(0.483) (0.792) (1.099)
time*Post-TRIPS -0.014*** -0.004* -0.009
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
time*time*Post-TRIPS – – 0.000*
(0.000)
time 0.018*** -0.001 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
time*time – – -0.000***
(0.000)
# OAs – -1.028** -1.020**
(0.408) (0.407)
# Restricts. – 2.353*** 2.358***
(0.504) (0.504)
Small Entity – 1.331 1.361
(1.265) (1.265)
Remainder – 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
U.S. Patentee – 2.794 2.842
(6.143) (6.140)
# Claims – 0.149*** 0.149***
(0.020) (0.020)
# Citations – -0.134*** -0.135***
(0.015) (0.015)
Continuation – 4.351*** 4.629***
(0.685) (0.703)
Divisional – -1.977*** -1.919***
(0.734) (0.730)
Nat’l Stage – 4.996*** 5.316***
(1.107) (1.106)
Provisional – 2.895 2.908
(1.963) (1.963)
Appealed – 16.449*** 16.506***
(1.455) (1.466)
Constant 195.662*** 199.055*** 199.590***
(0.212) (11.069) (11.093)
Fixed Eff. No Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.005 0.172 0.172
F-Test 718.68 6.73 4.84
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0012 0.0023
Observations 323,256 273,443 273,443
Notes : Dependent variable is applicant delay. Robust standard
errors in ( ) in col. (1); clustered standard errors at patent
assignee level in ( ) in cols. (2)-(3). Years: 1994-96. F-Test is
for Post-TRIPS and its interactions with time. Fixed effects
for patent assignee and patent class. *** = significant at 1%
level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
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Table 4: Effect of TRIPS on Applicant Requested Extensions
# Ext # Ext # Ext Ext? Ext? Ext?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-TRIPS -0.079*** -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.041*** -0.036*** -0.030***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
# OAs 0.718*** 0.422*** 0.421*** 0.288*** 0.229*** 0.221***
(0.004) (0.030) (0.033) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# Restricts. 0.318*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.109*** 0.061*** 0.054***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Small Entity – -0.012 -0.004 – 0.045*** 0.031***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002)
Remainder – 0.001*** 0.001*** – 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
U.S. Patentee – -0.039 -0.053 – -0.098*** -0.108***
(0.080) (0.100) (0.002) (0.002)
# Claims – 0.000 -0.000 – 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
# Citations – 0.000 0.000 – 0.000** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Continuation – 0.111*** 0.111*** – 0.090*** 0.072***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Divisional – -0.015* -0.021** – 0.019*** 0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Nat’l Stage – 0.014 0.020 – 0.055*** 0.032***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004)
Provisional – 0.035 0.034 – 0.075*** 0.052***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.009) (0.009)
Appealed – 1.221*** 1.185*** – 0.261*** 0.255***
(0.067) (0.072) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -0.104*** -0.365*** -0.382*** – – –
(0.004) (0.091) (0.097)
Years 1994-96 1994-96 No inner 1994-96 No inner No inner
window window window
Fixed Eff. No Yes Yes No No Yes
R-sq. 0.264 0.530 0.523 0.130 0.187 0.203
Obs. 407,707 334,178 265,423 407,707 272,861 272,852
Notes : OLS coefficients in cols. (1)-(3); dependent variable is number of extension
requests. Marginal effects coefficients for logit in cols. (4)-(6); dependent variable is
whether the applicant made an extension request. Robust standard errors in ( ) in
col. (1); clustered standard errors in ( ) at patent assignee level in cols. (2) and (3).
Fixed effects are for patent assignee and patent class in cols. (2) and (3), and class
in col. (6). R-squared is Adjusted R-squared in cols. (1)-(3) and pseudo R-squared
in cols. (4)-(6). Cols. (3), (5)-(6) exclude applications filed 12/8/94-8/8/95. *** =
significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.
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Table 5: Effect of TRIPS on Non-Final Office Action Response Time, Issue Fee









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Post-TRIPS Coefficient, % Maintained, and Patent Count Selection Measure
Across Subcategories
Delay Delay Log Delay Log Delay
Subcategory (5) (6) (7) (8) % Maint Pat Ct
Chemicals
Agric., Food, Textiles -2.62 (7.63) -3.72 (9.97) -3.04 (3.19) -2.56 (4.60) 36.60 17.11
Coating 0.43 (4.58) 7.20 (5.29) 1.05 (1.98) 3.10 (2.79) 47.55 10.35
Gas 7.28 (10.94) 5.58 (14.30) 4.29 (6.02) 3.99 (8.16) 44.37 8.00
Organic Compounds -6.58 (3.43)* -4.26 (3.77) -2.55 (1.33)* -1.90 (1.57) 44.09 13.86
Resins -1.15 (2.58) -1.17 (3.22) 0.10 (1.34) 0.53 (1.55) 50.27 16.24
Chem.-Misc. -3.69 (1.57)** -2.66 (1.74) -2.14 (0.79)*** -1.92 (0.95)** 45.70 7.96
Computers & Communications
Communications -4.62 (1.76)*** -4.53 (1.99)** -2.86 (0.91)*** -2.97 (1.03)*** 60.34 5.48
Comp. Hard. & Software -5.38 (1.83)*** -5.69 (2.29)** -2.13 (0.83)** -2.21 (1.04)** 60.38 8.45
Computer Peripherals -4.53 (3.32) -6.43 (4.22) -1.55 (1.54) -2.07 (2.01) 62.25 7.62
Information Storage -3.63 (2.82) -4.28 (2.68) -1.62 (1.47) -2.11 (1.37) 60.13 7.82
Elec. Bus. Meth. & Soft. -7.02 (6.31) -15.71 (9.82) -4.11 (2.19)* -6.47 (3.15)** 64.00 8.44
Drugs & Medical
Drugs -4.49 (2.16)** -3.68 (2.62) -1.74 (0.89)* -1.27 (1.12) 48.08 24.63
Surgery & Med Inst. -3.01 (2.83) -0.17 (3.47) -0.57 (1.57) 1.47 (2.01) 57.68 9.13
Genetics -19.00 (9.20)** -16.53 (13.38) -10.08 (4.04)** -9.90 (6.47) 60.95 29.83
Drugs and Med.-Misc. -5.26 (9.14) -7.79 (14.57) -2.93 (3.93) -3.27 (6.06) 53.23 9.23
Electrical & Electronics
Electrical Devices -0.74 (1.74) -0.05 (2.29) -0.63 (1.09) -0.33 (1.45) 51.52 3.84
Electrical Lighting -9.09 (3.53)** -5.71 (3.98) -3.28 (1.96)* -1.92 (2.23) 41.49 5.85
Measuring and Testing -4.83 (2.43)** -3.73 (2.94) -3.00 (1.38)** -3.37 (1.71)** 47.21 4.92
Nuclear & X-rays -0.16 (3.88) -0.73 (4.53) -0.31 (2.34) -0.71 (2.74) 51.80 5.76
Power Systems -1.76 (1.71) -2.36 (2.33) -0.97 (0.98) -1.09 (1.37) 52.93 5.82
Semiconductor Devices -3.76 (2.10)* -3.88 (2.31)* -1.59 (1.18) -1.72 (1.35) 63.60 8.40
Elec.-Misc. -0.38 (3.33) -1.99 (4.74) 0.40 (1.16) 0.39 (1.46) 56.63 5.59
Mechanical
Mat. Proc. & Handling 1.58 (2.63) 2.67 (3.26) 0.66 (1.38) 0.61 (1.70) 41.24 6.16
Metal Working -0.90 (3.42) -4.72 (4.67) -1.78 (1.82) -3.00 (2.34) 45.80 7.25
Motors & Engines + Parts -0.95 (2.50) 0.53 (3.31) -0.23 (0.92) 0.52 (1.21) 45.51 3.81
Optics -0.75 (3.65) -1.25 (5.21) -1.05 (1.87) -0.87 (2.69) 50.00 4.88
Transportation -1.38 (3.44) -0.11 (4.96) -1.65 (2.51) -0.86 (3.64) 36.14 3.71
Mech.-Misc. 3.28 (2.63) 2.99 (3.66) 1.60 (1.40) 2.12 (1.85) 41.02 3.98
Others
Agric., Husbandry, Food -2.41 (6.87) 1.04 (8.46) -2.05 (3.45) -1.40 (4.38) 35.43 5.00
Amusement Devices 4.02 (10.85) 2.67 (12.51) 0.71 (4.44) 0.97 (6.32) 28.60 3.75
Apparel & Textile 2.69 (4.61) 5.20 (5.77) 1.00 (2.39) 2.83 (3.15) 30.36 4.93
Earth Working & Wells -13.30 (13.12) -1.41 (10.57) -5.38 (7.17) -3.17 (8.52) 49.46 3.86
Furniture, House Fixtures -7.09 (5.78) -7.38 (7.72) -3.60 (3.10) -3.86 (4.04) 27.84 3.48
Heating 3.26 (6.65) 3.97 (10.39) 2.52 (3.66) 2.77 (5.39) 40.43 5.80
Pipes & Joints -0.76 (8.11) -2.68 (10.49) -1.24 (4.88) -2.17 (6.18) 47.75 5.07
Receptacles -5.70 (4.54) -4.46 (5.72) -4.29 (3.05) -3.93 (3.82) 32.95 6.41
Other-Misc. -4.78 (1.85)*** -5.66 (2.41)** -2.12 (1.06)** -2.68 (1.35)** 40.74 5.52
Notes : Cols. (5) and (6) ((7) and (8)) are coefficients when applicant delay (log applicant delay) is regressed on a
post-TRIPS dummy, as in specifications in the same-numbered columns in Table 2. Cols. (6) and (8) exclude patent
applications with effective filing dates between 12/8/94-8/8/95. Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by
100 for log specifications.
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Figure A.1: Applicant Delay Coefficient by Month
Notes: This figure shows how the applicant delay coefficient changed over time from January 1994
through December 1996. January 1994 is the omitted baseline month, with June 1995 as month
18 (when TRIPS went into effect) and July 1995 as month 19. Each month shows the coefficient
(with standard error bands) when regressing applicant delay on month dummies, with all controls
and fixed effects as used in the specification in column 5 of Table 2.
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Figure A.2: Pendency by Category
Notes: This graph shows how pendency (i.e., total prosecution time) changed for technologies broken
down by NBER category from January 1, 1994, through December 31, 1996. The local polynomial
regression is conducted using an Epanechnikov kernel of degree 0 and bandwidth of 14. “0” represents
June 8, 1995, when the new TRIPS regime went into effect.
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Figure A.3: Local Polynomial Test for Trend Break in Applicant Delay
Notes: This graph shows local polynomial regressions to test for a trend break on the date TRIPS
went into effect (June 8, 1995). The polynomials use Epanechnikov kernels of degree 0 and bandwidth
of 14. The left polynomial runs from January 1, 1994, to June 7, 1995, and the right polynomial
runs from June 8, 1995, to December 31, 1996. Gray areas show 95% confidence intervals.
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Tables
Table A.1: Post-TRIPS Coefficient, % Maintained, and Patent Count Selection Mea-
sure Across Subcategories: Alternate Specifications
Delay Delay Log Delay Log Delay
Subcategory (1) (2) (3) (4) % Maintain
Chemicals
Agric., Food, Textiles -1.23 (4.33) -3.03 (4.41) -2.31 (1.89) -2.59 (2.03) 36.60
Coating -1.43 (1.93) -2.69 (2.01) -0.51 (1.02) -1.52 (1.12) 47.55
Gas -1.62 (4.01) -1.17 (4.47) -0.75 (2.05) -0.44 (2.24) 44.37
Organic Compounds -12.58 (2.12)*** -10.99 (2.28)*** -6.57 (0.97)*** -6.25 (1.04)*** 44.09
Resins -9.23 (1.48)*** -9.60 (1.68)*** -4.28 (0.71)*** -4.31 (0.79)*** 50.27
Chem.-Misc. -5.76 (0.97)*** -6.36 (1.08)*** -3.32 (0.46)*** -3.66 (0.51)*** 45.70
Computers & Communications
Communications -7.54 (0.98)*** -9.17 (1.12)*** -4.09 (0.48)*** -4.92 (0.53)*** 60.34
Comp. Hard. & Software -7.50 (1.07)*** -9.23 (1.21)*** -3.58 (0.50)*** -4.43 (0.55)*** 60.38
Computer Peripherals -6.43 (1.55)*** -9.63 (1.70)*** -2.62 (0.73)*** -4.27 (0.81)*** 62.25
Information Storage -6.85 (1.47)*** -7.81 (1.54)*** -3.49 (0.68)*** -4.26 (0.73)*** 60.13
Elec. Bus. Meth. & Soft. -2.66 (2.76) -4.24 (3.09) -2.13 (1.24)* -2.49 (1.39)* 64.00
Drugs & Medical
Drugs -11.15 (1.23)*** -9.52 (1.34)*** -5.30 (0.51)*** -4.54 (0.56)*** 48.08
Surgery & Med Inst. -4.19 (1.56)*** -3.75 (1.74)** -2.42 (0.71)*** -2.11 (0.79)*** 57.68
Genetics -34.08 (5.48)*** -33.37 (5.75)*** -19.05 (2.98)*** -19.83 (3.17)*** 60.95
Drugs and Med.-Misc. -4.41 (2.92) -4.16 (3.29) -3.21 (1.59)** -2.99 (1.76)* 53.23
Electrical & Electronics
Electrical Devices -3.65 (1.29)*** -4.45 (1.47)*** -2.03 (0.73)*** -2.57 (0.81)*** 51.52
Electrical Lighting -3.97 (2.20)* -4.36 (2.49)* -1.12 (1.09) -1.43 (1.23) 41.49
Measuring and Testing -6.83 (1.44)*** -7.82 (1.57)*** -4.37 (0.78)*** -5.53 (0.85)*** 47.21
Nuclear & X-rays -7.05 (2.21)*** -8.18 (2.50)*** -3.14 (1.27)** -4.01 (1.42)*** 51.80
Power Systems -5.16 (1.28)*** -6.08 (1.45)*** -2.94 (0.71)*** -3.36 (0.78)*** 52.93
Semiconductor Devices -9.46 (1.46)*** -11.60 (1.67)*** -4.52 (0.68)*** -5.56 (0.75)*** 63.60
Elec.-Misc. -5.71 (1.58)*** -7.58 (1.82)*** -2.69 (0.71)*** -3.59 (0.79)*** 56.63
Mechanical
Mat. Proc. & Handling -0.44 (1.28) -1.38 (1.38) -0.96 (0.65) -1.54 (0.71)** 41.24
Metal Working -2.70 (1.73) -4.38 (1.93)** -2.05 (0.89)** -2.78 (0.99)*** 45.80
Motors & Engines + Parts -2.37 (1.79) -3.08 (2.12) -0.93 (0.77) -1.29 (0.86) 45.51
Optics -3.59 (2.01)* -6.70 (2.34)*** -1.83 (0.99)* -3.06 (1.09)*** 50.00
Transportation -1.64 (1.54) -1.86 (1.73) -1.73 (0.84)** -1.86 (0.95)** 36.14
Mech.-Misc. -3.12 (1.35)** -4.28 (1.51)*** -1.61 (0.70)** -2.21 (0.78)*** 41.02
Others
Agric., Husbandry, Food -3.01 (2.14) -5.41 (2.38)** -3.27 (1.14)*** -5.05 (1.25)*** 35.43
Amusement Devices 3.65 (2.76) 2.89 (2.96) 0.81 (1.44) 1.05 (1.63) 28.60
Apparel & Textile -4.76 (2.36)** -4.16 (2.69) -3.36 (1.17)*** -3.06 (1.32)** 30.36
Earth Working & Wells -7.71 (3.06)** -4.59 (3.04) -3.21 (1.52)** -2.61 (1.70) 49.46
Furniture, House Fixtures -2.71 (1.76) -2.31 (2.01) -2.18 (0.99)** -2.08 (1.12)* 27.84
Heating -6.56 (3.03)** -7.72 (3.48)** -3.05 (1.52)** -3.89 (1.72)** 40.43
Pipes & Joints -5.17 (3.69) -6.86 (4.16)* -3.36 (1.50)** -4.64 (1.68)*** 47.75
Receptacles -2.88 (2.31) -3.98 (2.75) -2.29 (1.13)** -3.24 (1.26)** 32.95
Other-Misc. -6.27 (0.94)*** -8.08 (1.06)*** -3.26 (0.48)*** -4.13 (0.53)*** 40.74
Notes : Cols. (1) and (2) ((3) and (4)) are coefficients when applicant delay (log applicant delay) is regressed on a
post-TRIPS dummy, as in specifications in the same-numbered columns in Table 2. Cols. (2) and (4) exclude patent
applications with effective filing dates between 12/8/94-8/8/95. Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by
100 for log specifications.
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